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Second-Order Law · What a Regulation Actually Does · 01

The Circular

How a Directive Reaches the Street

The circular is one of the most powerful instruments in Nigerian economic life and one of the least examined. It is not an Act of the National Assembly, yet a direction to financial institutions can reach a woman selling tomatoes in Wuse who has never heard of it. This essay follows six real circulars from the desk that signed them to the counter where they landed, and asks what changes on the journey.

Paul Magaji17 min read
In this essay · 11 sections

On 6 December 2022 a letter went out from the Banking Supervision Department of the Central Bank of Nigeria. It carried a reference number, BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/015/069, and it was addressed to deposit money banks, payment service banks, primary mortgage banks and microfinance banks. Its subject was the naira redesign and the revised cash withdrawal limits that would follow it.

It said that from 9 January 2023 the ordinary weekly over-the-counter ceiling would be one hundred thousand naira for an individual and five hundred thousand for a company. It set the automated teller machine at twenty thousand a day, within a weekly ceiling of one hundred thousand. It directed that the machines be loaded with two-hundred-naira notes and below. Exceptional larger withdrawals carried conditions as well as processing fees of five and ten per cent. The exception was not the same thing as permission to pay any amount merely by paying the charge.

Fifteen days later, on 21 December 2022, a second letter went out under the reference BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/015/073. The weekly limit for individuals was now five hundred thousand naira, and for companies five million — five times and ten times what had been set a fortnight before. The Bank said it had received feedback from stakeholders.

The rule had been answered before it commenced.

That fifteen-day sequence does not, by itself, settle the lawfulness of either direction. It does show what the instrument can do. A circular is a rule written at the speed of a memorandum, landing in a country that responds at the speed of a market, and the gap between those two speeds is where a great deal of Nigeria’s recent economic history has taken place.

Act One

What a Circular Is, and Whom It Binds

Begin with the law, because the popular understanding of a circular is wrong in a way that matters.

A circular is not an Act of the National Assembly. It is a working form through which the Central Bank can communicate supervisory directions and rules under the Central Bank of Nigeria Act 2007 and the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 2020. It may be signed by a director rather than assented to by a President; it does not pass through the chambers as a bill does. But its legal effect comes from the power behind it, not the heading above it. What may be required for its making, publication and commencement depends on the applicable law and the instrument itself. A memorandum’s appearance is not a licence to outrun a statute.

More importantly for this essay, the directions operate through banks and other regulated institutions. The 6 December circular did not ask the woman at the market to redraw her household budget. It instructed institutions handling her money to change what they would pay out, subject to its terms. The difference is not a technicality — it is the mechanism. A direction aimed at the institutions arrives among their customers as a fact of life, delivered by a teller who did not write it and may have had no part in deciding how to explain it.

This is the circular’s peculiar power and its peculiar danger. It has the reach of legislation, the speed of an internal memorandum, and none of the deliberative machinery of either. It is drafted by people who understand banking and lands on people who understand markets. Those are not the same competence.

A circular speaks to the institutions. Its consequences travel among their customers. That asymmetry is the instrument.

Act Two

The Chain of Transmission

Between the signature and the street there is a chain. Follow it, for a moment, as an analytical illustration: not a finding about every bank, but a way of seeing how a written direction can become a lived restriction.

The circular reaches a compliance department first. In this illustration, compliance reads it conservatively: the officer sees the penalty for permitting what is forbidden more clearly than the cost of forbidding what is permitted. The conservative reading becomes an internal memorandum. The memorandum becomes a system configuration — a hard limit coded into the banking application, which may express a ceiling more readily than an exception or the phrase in compelling circumstances. The configuration becomes a message on a screen at a branch in Lafia. The teller reads the screen aloud to a customer, in whatever words come to hand.

By the time the rule arrives, in this model, it has become stricter than it was written. Each link has rounded towards the risk it can most easily see. The customer then hears a rule that no document contains in quite that form, from a person who cannot readily cite the exception, and arranges his affairs accordingly. The point is not that every bank rounds in one direction. It is that implementation is itself a place where the rule is made.

Two insights follow from the illustration. The first is that the rule as experienced need not be the rule as issued, so analysis of the text alone can miss the institution through which the text must pass. The second is that the gap may weigh most heavily on the person least able to challenge it. The customer who knows the reference number and can quote the exception has a resource the other customer lacks. Knowledge of the instrument is itself a form of capital. The reference number has become part of the transaction, although it appears on neither the receipt nor the account balance.

Act Three

Six Circulars, Read to Their Second Sentence

What follows is the cluster’s discipline applied to six real instruments. Each is named by reference and date. The instrument supplies the first sentence; the reading of adaptation is the argument about the second. Where a documented response ends and an interpretation begins matters as much as the chronology.

Rule 01

The withdrawal limit

BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/015/069 · 6 December 2022 · effective 9 January 2023

Weekly over-the-counter withdrawals capped at one hundred thousand naira for individuals and five hundred thousand for corporates; automated teller machine withdrawals capped at twenty thousand daily within a weekly ceiling of one hundred thousand; only two-hundred-naira denominations and below to be loaded into the machines. Exceptional larger over-the-counter withdrawals were available under stated conditions, with processing fees of five and ten per cent for individuals and corporates respectively. The fee did not buy an unrestricted right to cash: the direction also required limits, documentation and approval. Those are the terms of the first letter, not the revision that followed fifteen days later.

The Adaptation

The adaptation began before commencement, and it took the form of representation rather than avoidance — banks, traders and the National Assembly pressed at once, and the Bank revised the figures within fifteen days. That is itself a second-order effect worth naming: where a rule is made quickly and can be unmade quickly, the first response is not to change one’s behaviour but to attempt to change the rule.

Rule 02

The revision

BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/015/073 · 21 December 2022 · effective 9 January 2023

Weekly limits across all channels raised to five hundred thousand naira for individuals and five million for corporates, the Bank citing feedback from stakeholders. Exceptional withdrawals remained subject to conditions; the revised fees were three and five per cent, not the first letter’s five and ten. The direction of travel remained towards less cash, but the price and the permitted quantities had changed. To read the two letters as one rule is to miss the answer the first had already received.

The Adaptation

Once the cap survived in softer form, it met another fact: acute scarcity of the redesigned notes. The point-of-sale agent did not have to be invented; the agent network was already there. What scarcity made newly valuable was access to banknotes. In the World Bank’s account, the short redesign transition and inadequate replacement supply helped turn cash itself into a good sold at a premium. The point of the example is not that Nigerians suddenly preferred agents, or that one circular alone caused the shortage. It is that a restriction, a supply failure and an existing intermediary can meet at the same counter, and leave the cash-dependent customer paying for their combined effect.

Rule 03

The prohibition

BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/014/001 · 5 February 2021

Banks and other financial institutions directed away from facilitating cryptocurrency exchange payments and towards closure of the relevant accounts. The Bank’s subsequent account of the restriction cited money-laundering and terrorism-financing risks, alongside gaps in regulation and consumer protection. The distinction matters: the restriction is the instrument; the later explanation is an explanation of it.

The Adaptation

Trading did not stop. Peer-to-peer and other arrangements offered a way around the exchange’s direct banking relationship: two individuals could settle in naira while the asset moved separately. The irony is sharp even without pretending that the result was perfect anonymity. Banking records could remain; blockchains could still be analysed. But the exchange account through which a supervisor might have watched the business was no longer the necessary meeting place. Escrow, counterparty and dispute risks did not disappear with the account. Closing an account can change where a risk is seen without changing the desire to take it. The record may survive while the familiar place to supervise the business does not.

Rule 04

The reversal

FPR/DIR/PUB/CIR/002/003 · 22 December 2023

Guidelines on the operation of bank accounts for virtual asset service providers, expressly superseding the February 2021 circular and an earlier one of January 2017. Banks may now open designated accounts for providers licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, while remaining prohibited from trading in virtual currencies on their own account.

The Adaptation

This is the rarer and more instructive move: a second rule that, in my reading, made a regulated path more usable rather than relying on exclusion alone. The Bank conditioned access on the licensing and account requirements of the framework; it did not abandon supervision or promise immunity to unlicensed activity. There is still an asymmetry worth noticing. A channel abandoned under threat of account closure does not have to repopulate merely because the terms change. Trust, on this account, is rebuilt by experience, not by the reversal of a sentence. Reversal is not symmetry. The cost of the intervening years does not come back.

Rule 05

The levy withdrawn before the deadline

PSMD/DIR/PUB/LAB/017/004 · 6 May 2024 · withdrawn by the circular of 17 May 2024

Implementation guidance requiring banks, mobile money operators and payment service providers to deduct half a per cent on the value of electronic transactions, subject to its exemptions, and remit the proceeds to the National Cybersecurity Fund. The guidance invoked the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) (Amendment) Act 2024 and prescribed a separate narration on the customer’s statement. It allowed two weeks for deductions to begin and longer periods for specified systems work. The Bank withdrew the circular on 17 May, in a single sentence. The letter had lasted eleven days; the withdrawal came before the two-week deduction deadline had expired.

The Adaptation

Eleven days — enough, in the model this essay is tracing, for a proposed charge to enter the future people plan around. A finance team need not wait for a first deduction before asking what a payment will cost; a bank need not wait before deciding what it would have to build. That is how an announcement can have a second life before implementation. It is not evidence that every institution commissioned work or that no institution ever deducted anything. Note also what withdrawal can and cannot do. Rescinding the collection guidance does not itself amend the statute. Who owes a statutory charge, whether it can lawfully be passed to a customer, and what later law requires are further questions. A letter can withdraw a direction. It cannot, by the same stroke, answer all the questions the direction raised.

Rule 06

The third rule

FPRD/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/011 · 2 December 2025 · effective 1 January 2026

The cumulative deposit limit and the fee on excess deposits removed; weekly withdrawals across all channels set at five hundred thousand naira for individuals and five million for corporates; automated teller machine withdrawals set at one hundred thousand daily within that weekly ceiling; the monthly special authorisation for very large withdrawals discontinued.

The Adaptation

Three years after the December 2022 sequence, the subject returns with some punitive edges filed off — the deposit charge removed, the daily ATM ceiling raised — and others retained: excess withdrawals still attract charges of three and five per cent on the excess for individuals and corporates respectively. Exemptions also change. This is not an easing for every customer in every circumstance. Read alongside Rule 01, I take it as an invitation to examine the second-order sequence: a rule, an adaptation, an intermediary already in place, and a later rule adjusting the terms. That is my reading, not a concession recorded by the Bank. Whether the newer framework changes behaviour in the way intended is a question for evidence after implementation, not for a prediction dressed as a finding.

Act Four

What the Circulars Built

Take the six together, and four constructions stand out — none of them written in any of the documents.

An intermediary economy. The point-of-sale agent was already part of the landscape before these letters were written. Scarcity gave the access that an intermediary could provide a new urgency and, in affected markets, a premium. Whether one reads that as financial inclusion under strain or as a privatised toll on cash — and there is a serious argument on both sides — the analytical question remains: who stands between the rule and the person who must live under it? The documents alone cannot tell us how much of the network’s growth to assign to any one instrument.

A price for cash. When a good is capped below what people will pay for it, a premium appears at a distance from the counter. The premium is not evidence of criminality. It is a price doing what prices do, in the only place left available to it.

A shadow channel. The 2021 restriction did not abolish the demand for the transaction; it changed the routes by which that demand could be met. The continued peer-to-peer activity described in the IMF account makes the question unavoidable. Channels learned under a restriction may outlive the restriction, because the people who learned them have acquired something they can keep using. A second rule may reopen a door without emptying the path around the house.

An expectation. The levy sequence offers a way to think about the next announcement touching electronic payment. A public that has once been asked to prepare for a deduction may listen differently when another letter arrives. Credibility is an asset that instruments spend. The proposition here is that an announcement can spend some of it before a charge is collected; the documents do not put a number on the expenditure or a date on its recovery.

What is withdrawn in a sentence may already have entered the future people were planning for.

One correction is owed here, or this essay becomes the very thing the cluster refuses to be. None of the above establishes that these circulars should not have been issued.

Currency held permanently outside the banking system is a real problem, with real consequences for monetary policy, for taxation and for the financing of violence. Unregulated virtual-asset intermediation is a real problem, and Nigeria’s own experience of collapsed platforms is evidence enough. The correct question is never whether an instrument produced unintended effects, since every instrument does. It is whether it produced fewer bad effects than the next best instrument available — including the instrument of doing nothing, which in each of these cases also had a cost.

Act Five

Why the Circular Is the Sharpest Instrument in the Country

An Act of the National Assembly is slow. It is debated, reported, amended, assented and gazetted, and by the time it commences the affected parties have had months to arrange themselves. That delay is usually treated as a defect of the legislative process. It is at least as accurate to call it a feature: it gives the country time to answer before the rule is fixed, and it gives the drafter time to hear the answer.

The circular has no such interval. It can be signed on a Tuesday and effective within the month, and it can be unsigned as quickly. In an economy that must move faster than legislation — foreign exchange, payments, systemic risk — that speed is exactly what is needed, and no serious person proposes that a central bank should require an Act to change a limit.

But speed removes the one thing that makes second-order effects visible in advance: the interval in which the people who will be affected can say what they will do. Consultation is not a courtesy in this analysis. It is the cheapest available instrument for discovering the second sentence before it is written in the country rather than in a document.

Three practical consequences follow for anyone who must live under these instruments — a business, an adviser, a citizen.

  1. Read the circular itself, by reference number, and not the reporting of it. The distance between what a circular says and what the public understands it to say is where most avoidable loss occurs.
  2. Read the announcement as well as the commencement. Behaviour can move before a legal obligation begins. Keep the two dates apart: a planning response is not proof that a charge commenced, and a withdrawn direction can still have entered the calculations people made.
  3. Watch for the second rule. When an adaptation frustrates a circular, the question is whether the next instrument goes after the adaptation or after the incentive. The December 2023 framework made conditional access possible again. The question is whether a usable regulated route changes the incentive more effectively than exclusion alone; the change in the letter does not settle the answer.

The Determination

The cluster’s six questions, answered for the withdrawal-limit sequence of December 2022 — the fullest of the six, and the one with three years of evidence behind it.

What was forbidden

Not cash itself, but access to it above the ordinary ceilings. Exceptional larger withdrawals carried conditions as well as a price: initially 5%/10%, then 3%/5% under the revision. Where a price is set, someone may be willing to pay it; willingness alone does not satisfy the conditions.

Who adapted first

The advantage, in the model, lay with those already able to transact electronically or reorganise their cash handling. For a trader paid in notes and buying stock in notes, an instruction to use less cash is not yet a way to do it.

What substitute appeared

Cash at a premium, with existing point-of-sale agents among the routes to it. The instrument met the note shortage and an intermediary network already in place; none of the three can be read as the whole story.

Where the cost landed

On the cash-dependent transaction: a market purchase, a fare, a day of casual labour. The vulnerability lies in needing notes when the system is asking for fewer of them.

What was created

A price for access to notes during scarcity, and a sharper question about the intermediary between a customer and cash. Agent banking itself was not created by these circulars; the rule arrived in a country that already had agents.

What the state did next

It revised within fifteen days and returned to the subject in the framework effective 1 January 2026, removing deposit charges while retaining excess-withdrawal charges. I read the sequence as adaptation meeting adaptation. Whether it is a concession, and whose costs it reduces, requires more than the fact of revision.

Compared with what? Against an alternative in which several trillion naira circulate permanently outside the banking system, the case for some instrument is strong. Against a different instrument — the same policy phased across four quarters, with denominations available and agents provisioned in advance — the December 2022 sequence looks less like a necessary cost than an avoidable one. That is the comparison that matters, and it is the comparison the public argument never held.

Return to the woman selling tomatoes in Wuse.

She was not addressed by BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/015/069. She is not a deposit money bank, a payment service bank, a primary mortgage bank or a microfinance bank. The document does not contemplate her, and not a line of it could be enforced against her.

She paid for it anyway — in the premium on the cash she needed to buy stock, in the customers who could not pay her by transfer, in the days her table stayed half empty. She never read the circular, and she was, in the end, its principal subject.

A circular is addressed to institutions. Its cost can arrive among people who have no other way to transact.

A note on this reading

The Wuse trader and the journey through the Lafia branch are analytical illustrations. The instrument references establish what was directed; the interpretations of adaptation, knowledge and credibility are the argument made here. The sources distinguish that chronology from measured outcomes.

Sources and references

  1. CBN — Naira Redesign Policy: Revised Cash Withdrawal Limits

    BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/015/069 · 6 December 2022 · paragraphs 1–6

    Original issuer link; a CBN scan mirrored by FIJ was checked alongside the 21 December revision mirrored by Nnamdi Azikiwe University. Initial exceptional OTC withdrawals required a compelling circumstance, monthly ceilings, specified documentation and approvals as well as 5%/10% fees. The later 3%/5% terms should not be read back into this letter.

  2. CBN — Re: Naira Redesign Policy: Revised Cash Withdrawal Limits

    BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/015/073 · 21 December 2022

    Original issuer link; direct access was unavailable during the source review.

  3. CBN — Letter on Cryptocurrency

    BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/014/001 · 5 February 2021

    Original issuer link; the full original was not independently accessible during the source review. Historical restriction later superseded.

  4. CBN — Guidelines on Operations of Bank Accounts for Virtual Assets Service Providers

    FPR/DIR/PUB/CIR/002/003 · 22 December 2023 · sections 5, 6 and 7.3

    Original issuer link; direct access was unavailable during the source review, which used an attributed reproduction.

  5. CBN — Cybersecurity Levy Implementation Guidance

    6 May 2024 · operative items 1–5 and exemptions appendix

    Issuer-text reproduction on RegAlert. This circular was subsequently withdrawn; it is not a statement of current levy liability.

  6. CBN — Withdrawal of Cybersecurity Levy Circular

    PSM/DIR/PUB/LAB/017/005 · 17 May 2024

    CBN-issued signed scan hosted by Refuge Mortgage Bank. It rescinds the May 6 guidance. The May 6 two-week deduction deadline had not expired on May 17; that is not proof that no deductions occurred. Withdrawal does not itself amend the statute or settle present customer liability. Announcement effects in the essay are analytical illustrations.

  7. CBN — Revised Cash-Related Policies

    FPRD/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/011 · 2 December 2025 · items 1–5 and 10 · effective 1 January 2026

    Original issuer link; the source register identifies the attributed reproduction used for the terms. The framework retains 3%/5% fees on excess withdrawals and changes exemptions as well as removing deposit charges. Concession is the essay's interpretation, not a statement of the Bank's motive.

  8. CBN Act 2007 — supervisory guidelines

    Section 33(1)(b)

    An enabling power to issue guidelines is not a blanket finding that every circular is valid or exempt from publication requirements. The compliance-chain narrative illustrates a mechanism, not measured practice at every bank.

  9. World Bank — Nigeria Development Update, June 2023

    Overview and Box 1.1 · redesign transition and cash scarcity

    The report describes cash scarcity and transaction costs. It does not isolate every effect of the withdrawal directions. No occupation-by-occupation incidence or permanent growth effect is estimated in this essay.

  10. CBN — Payments System Supervision

    2013 agent-banking and 2015 super-agent milestones

    The institutional agent framework predates the December 2022 directions.

  11. IMF — Regulating the Crypto Market in Nigeria (2025/096)

    Printed pp4, 7–9 · paragraphs 9, 16–17 and 25

    Institutional research supports the historical account and discusses supervisory visibility; it is not binding law or a measure of fraud caused by one direction. Payment records and blockchain analysis can preserve traces. The complete 2021 letter was not independently accessible; the 2023 covering circular supplies the CBN's retrospective explanation.